The consultation on same sex marriage

I read the report on the consultation on same-sex marriage with a certain professional interest: my team processed the previous consultation on civil partnerships in 2004. Nicola Sturgeon was subject to some hostile questioning on Newsnight Scotland about the treatment of the consultation, on the basis that a majority of respondents were clearly opposed in principle. But a consultation is not a sort of referendum; the purpose is not to count heads, but to make sure that a full range of views is taken into account.

Part of the problem is that consultations are presented as if the proportion of respondents mattered. We wrote in our report:

The consultation was not in any sense numerically representative, and caution should be exercised in interpreting the pattern of responses on the basis of majorities or minorities. The validity of a consultation depends, not on numerical representation, but on the extent to which it succeeds in representing and giving voice to diverse groups and shades of opinion. … A quantitative analysis does not really do justice to the range and diversity of responses. Many responses did not follow the pro-forma. Some responses respond to one question with the answer to another; others try to shoehorn issues under ill-fitting headings. … Where issues are raised by several respondents, this has the effect of cross-validation and reinforcement. This is the primary basis of analysis. However, it is also true that isolated responses may raise issues of importance: … where there are complex legal issues to unravel, particular responses also pose specific problems, cite examples and identify conflicts. In these circumstances we have recorded these concerns and sought to report on issues which require resolution.

This was reported in the press as saying that “Most Scots back plans to recognise gay marriages as legal, according to a study by the Robert Gordon University.” (Aberdeen Press and Journal 6.2.04) The Daily Mail headline (17.2.04) complained that “Same-sex marriage survey was hijacked by gay rights lobby” and that the consultation was “flawed” because several similar responses had come in from Stonewall.

From which I take it that either the press don’t understand what a consultation is about; or that they don’t bother reading the reports; or that the whole issue is so emotive that they will only read what they want to read. Possibly all three.

"Troubled" families

Louise Casey’s report, Listening to Troubled Families, does what it says in the title: it reports the concerns of issues of a number of families with problems. She’s convinced that intensive social work can make a difference, and as far as that goes I have no disagreement. But there are serious problems in the language that she is using, and in particular in her persistent references to inter-generational problems. She’s talked about “welfare dependency and sexual abuse going back generations.” She refers to “entrenched cycles of suffering problems and causing problems”. She claimed that “problems such as sexual abuse, teenage pregnancies, domestic violence, juvenile delinquency and educational failure were often repeated by different generations.”

This argument has a long history. “Troubled families” have been called degenerates, moral defectives, the abyss, problem families, multi-problem families, the ‘hard to reach’ and the underclass. The claim that they passed problems from one generation to another features in arguments on degeneracy, the culture of poverty, the cycle of deprivation, transmitted deprivation and the dependency culture. And what we can say about all of these arguments, because there are decades of evidence to draw on, is that they are not true. The population of people who have problems now is not substantially the same as those who will have problems in ten years’ time. Most adults have varying experiences through their lifetimes. Most children from deprived backgrounds are not deprived as adults. Keith Joseph, who coined the phrase “the cycle of deprivation”, set up a major social science project to investigate it. From that project, we know that if, over a long period of time, we begin with a cohort of the most deprived children and follow them through the generations, their great-grandchildren will have much the same profile as the rest of the population. For example, as part of the work, a thousand deprived families in Newcastle were followed through the generations. They did not pass down problems from parent to child. (The main source is I Kolvin and others, Continuities of deprivation, Avebury 1990.)

Why refer to poverty as a proportion of median income?

This is the abstract of a paper I’ve just had published in the Journal of Poverty and Social Justice, vol 20(2) pp 163-176 – the paper is not online yet but I have received a paper copy, so it will appear shortly.

“The most widely used indicator of poverty refers to a threshold set at 60% of median income. This paper reviews the implications of this approach and the conceptual problems it raises. The threshold relates to inequality and ‘economic distance’ rather than need. Though it was initially intended to be simple and comprehensible, the indicator causes considerable confusion, and successive refinements, including adjustments for disposable income, housing costs and equivalence, have limited the accessibility and use of the figures. Referring to median earnings would be a simpler, more practical approach.”

From the Department of Circumlocution

Following the publication of the draft Universal Credit Regulations, I have been looking at the rules defining couples. Under the new rules, couples are being required to claim jointly, and neither has any secrets from the other. Couples are defined in the Welfare Reform Act 2012, s.39, as follows:

    “(1) In this Part “couple” means—

  • (a) a man and woman who are married to each other and are members of the same household;
  • (b) a man and woman who are not married to each other but are living together as husband and wife;
  • (c) two people of the same sex who are civil partners of each other and are members of the same household;
  • (d) two people of the same sex who are not civil partners of each other but are living together as civil partners.

(2) For the purposes of this section, two people of the same sex are to be treated as living together as if they were civil partners if, and only if, they would be treated as living together as husband and wife were they of opposite sexes.”

I was intrigued by the description of people in same sex relationships as “living together as civil partners” when they are not civil partners. When the legislation governing civil partnership was introduced, the government went out of its way to emphasise that it was not a form of marriage. Civil partnership was deliberately defined in terms of public commitment, and strongly distinguished from marriage. Now we find it treated in the same terms as “living together as husband and wife”. Neither definition, of course, explains directly what this means.

Poverty, democratic governance and poverty reduction strategies

I have given a presentation today at an International Symposium in Istanbul, Turkey, organised by Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakif University and Sosyal Politikalar Dernegi.  The argument was this:

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers have become a significant experiment in world governance.  Poverty is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon, and responses to poverty need to be adapt to a wide range of circumstances.  In the belief that deliberative democracy is the route to prosperity, international organisations have directed governments around the world to undertake a process of strategic planning, based on participative development and negotiation of policy with stakeholders. However, the emphasis in the PRSPs seems to have fallen more on the methods they use than the substance of the strategies.  Democracy is not valued only for its process; it matters what it achieves.   If PRSPs are to help the poor, they need to extend their focus, moving beyond procedural issues towards substantive policies that stand to benefit the poor.

Here is a copy of the slides and a copy of the paper.

Symposium in Istanbul

The scope of the welfare state

Policy Press asked me recently to lead off a discussion on the Welfare State with a short 300 words. My contribution is here.

The issue I’ve raised is about the scope of government, and that will be part of my next book, Reclaiming Individualism. The typescript will go to the publisher in August for publication next April.

Good news from Africa

This table is drawn from a recent study looking at the fall of mortality in Kenya. It points to a general trend: across Africa, more children are surviving.

Under 5 mortality (per 1000 live births)
Previous studies (1998-2007)

Most recent study (2005-2009)
Benin

160 (2001)

125 (2006)
Ethiopia

166 (2000)

124 (2005)
Ghana

111 (2003)

80 (2008)
Kenya

115 (2003)

74 (2009)
Liberia

110 (2007)

114 (2009)
Madagascar

94 (2004)

72 (2009)
Mali

229 (2001)

191 (2006)
Namibia

62 (2000)

69 (2007)
Niger

274 (1998)

198 (2006)
Nigeria

201 (2003)

157 (2008)
Rwanda

152 (2005)

103 (2008)
Senegal

121 (2005)

85 (2009)
Tanzania

147 (1999)

112 (2005)
Uganda

152 (2001)

128 (2006)
Zambia

168 (2002)

119 (2007)
Zimbabwe

102 (1999)

83 (2006)

Stephen Radelet, in Emerging Africa?, claims that the factors behind this improvement are

  • “more democratic and accountable governments
  • more sensible economic policies,
  • the end of the debt crisis and major changes in relationships with the international community
  • new technologies that are creating new opportunities for business and political accountability, and
  • a new generation of policymakers, activists, and business leaders.”

There are problems – such as the recent (hopefully short term) increase in mortality in Liberia. But the trend is clear, and it is very good news indeed – especially for those who are concerned about population increase, because there is a clear and strong association between infant survival and the number of children a woman must have.

Life expectancy and pensions

A report by PWC on pensions draws attention to some fairly startling projections about life expectancy; they claim that pensioners born in 2050 will have an average life expectancy of 104. The source of the prediction are tables produced by the Office of National Statistics – this link goes to their main projection. For people born in 2050, the projection is that 48.4% of males, and 55% of females, will live to 100. The ONS also note that “As only one person worldwide has ever been verified as living beyond 120, estimates of numbers surviving to very old ages are highly uncertain.”

There are no strong reasons here for immediate panic. Even if the pension age stays at 66, people born today will not get their pension until 2078; and the troublingly long-lived babies of 2050 will get their pension in 2116. That is far enough away for our great grandchildren to be able to do the sums, probably a little more effectively than we can.

Value for money in child care

The recent events in Rochdale, where under-age girls were forced into prostitution, have mainly focused on other issues. Prostitution has been a long-standing problem for young people in care – vulnerable teenagers who have been abused and sexualised at a young age, are often open to the opportunity, and no institution has ever found a satisfactory resolution. One of the issues which came out of the recent case was that one young girl who was placed in a single unit, with six full time workers, nevertheless managed to spend one or two nights a week out – 19 times in three months, which sounds worse.

The cost of this private unit has been reported variously at £225,000 to £250,000 a year. Most authorities have some children farmed out in this sort of arrangement. That poses a question which has mainly been considered at much lower levels of need – whether such intensive childcare is justifiable. We know that the outcomes of formal care are generally poor, and that many arrangements end up making things worse. But there is a standard, default comparison: how a child would fare in substitute family care instead. What are the objections to paying a full-time foster parent a living income – say, £40,000 a year – instead of paying £225,000 for six-full time workers?

There are four main objections, and none of them seems to me to stack up. The first is professional training. I think we have to ask what a very damaged child needs to have provided on a 24 hour, 365 basis – thoughtful, systematic intervention or a secure, protective life style. There is no reason why these cannot both be done – but also no reason why they have to be done at the same time. The second is the variable quality of foster care, including – in the worst cases – abuse. That is true, but the same is true of residential units. Many local authorities take the view that they cannot pass an ungovernable child to any but the best foster parent. While I understand their reticence, the illusion is that they have a better option in residential care.

The third is that it is not possible to pay someone a large amount of money in a fostering allowance without treating them as an employee. That’s not right – this is family support, and family support doesn’t have respite or hourly rates of pay – but clarification of the law would help. The fourth is that while one can pass legal responsibility to a private provider, a local authority cannot pass it to a foster parent. That is true, but it shouldn’t matter. Local authorities are not minimising harm to a child by keeping the child in residential care instead. In relation to the third and fourth points, both hang on current constructions of legal responsibility. If the law is working against the child’s best interests, we should change it.

There are no general rules, but in every case where a child is in residential care, the question needs at least to be asked: why is this child not in substitute family care instead? If the only objections are the four I have mentioned, they should be overruled. Increasing the use of substitute care in the most difficult circumstances will inevitably lead to some bad decisions, and some disasters, but let’s be blunt: it’s disastrous now.

Personalisation falls short

This is the abstract of an article I’ve written, newly published in the British Journal of Social Work.

Personalisation offers individualised treatment in circumstances where markets do not operate. Personalisation is described variously as a process involving an individualised assessment and response, the expression of individual preferences and choices, or a process in which users and professionals negotiate a common understanding of the needs of the individual. The core arguments for individualised approaches are effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness to need. However, personalisation sometimes falls short of the claims made for it. It is not always effective, because matching people to resources is time-consuming, difficult and dependent on so many conditions that mismatches are inevitable. It may be inefficient, because it is difficult to deliver selective services without either misplaced provision or inappropriate denial of service. There is only limited support to be found for the belief that services have become more responsive to individual circumstances as a consequence of personalisation, or that they are better matched to need. The case for personalisation has to be argued and proved in the context in which it is applied.