Universal Credit and a pattern of fraud

A major fraud has been reported affecting Universal Credit.  Over the course of the last eight and a half years, I’ve frequently commented on the vulnerability of the UC system to fraud and error, despite repeated claims from the government – and the falsification of the business case – to claim the opposite.  This fraud is different from most, because it represents organised criminal activity that is neither attributable to claimants nor to DWP officials.  The criminals  pretend to be other people, both claimants and people who have not claimed, to register for short term loans before any checks might be made.  (This is not, for the most part, ‘identity theft’; it is personation.  A fraud of this sort is typically a fraud on the DWP, not on the claimaint.)

It should have been obvious from the outset that computer-based identification wouldn’t be sufficiently secure for the purposes of the DWP.  There was something close to an admission of this more than  three years ago, when Verify, the successor to the failed “Identity Assurance”, was cut adrift.  But the problem is not only down to poor tech.  The situation has been produced by a system that relied on online verification, rather than claims in person; that left claimants without resources for well over a month; and replaced a system capable of processing the vast majority of claims within 14 days with one that struggled to do it in six weeks, and sometimes could take as long as three months.   Universal Credit is error-prone by design.  Its vulnerability to deception is only a part of that.

 

 

The reform of social care will take more than money

The House of Lords Economic Affairs committee has called for free personal care in England, on lines similar to the system in Scotland.  “Under free personal care individuals would therefore only receive funding for support with these basic activities of daily living, based on the minimum threshold of eligible needs as defined by the Care Act.” They are recommending a major increase in the funding for social care, so that care can be delivered on much the same terms as health care.  However, they accept that people should pay accommodation costs themselves, with means-tested support, and they recognise that this might entail “catastrophic accommodation costs” which might have to be subject to a cap.

This has been welcomed as a radical proposal, but it doesn’t touch on most of the problems that go with social care.  We’re still thinking of social care as a set of needs which can be satisfied by specific cash payments.  The Lords report explains:

“Personal care means essential help with basic activities of daily living, such as washing and bathing, dressing, continence, mobility and help with eating and drinking. It does not include other areas where support might be needed, such as assistance with housework, laundry or shopping.”

I don’t believe that a system based on this approach can ever deliver what people want to see.  I don’t believe people want, or are comfortable with, successive 15 minute visits from a team of people who bathe them, or dress them, or help them to bed.  I don’t believe that what most people really want in life is to manage a rota.  I think that providing for a series of events, sold as if they were commodities, meets people’s human needs.  What we should be allocating is time with a person, and that calls for a different approach to assessing needs from one that focuses on whether or not someone needs help with brushing their teeth.

A Scottish supplement to benefits for children

The announcement of a Scottish “child poverty” benefit has to be welcome.  In principle, it will increase the incomes of many families by £10 per week per child, starting with children under the age of six.  Focusing on the under-sixes is good; there’s a clear relationship between the age of the youngest children and low incomes.   So is the promise that it will be there for every child in a family.

The main problem with reliance on qualifying benefits is that receipt is going to reflect the deficiencies in that system.  One clear problem is takeup.  I’m not convinced by the HMRC claim that CTC goes to 85% of all potential recipients (if it’s true, it’s more accessible than any other means-tested benefit), but that still leaves out the 15% who don’t get it.  A second problem is that entitlement is intermittent, particularly for benefits assessed on the basis of income; and benefit entitlement can be interrupted by sanctions, which shouldn’t be relevant for this supplement.    Dealing with changes in circumstances – including moving out of Scotland – could also be problematic.

In practice, the details are still vague; I’ve been greatly helped by a reference supplied by Ian Davidson, who pointed me towards the Position Paper posted on Wednesday by the Scottish Government.  The qualifying benefits will be:

  • Child Tax Credit
  • Universal Credit
  • Income Support
  • Pension Credit
  • Working Tax Credit
  • Housing Benefit
  • Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)
  • Income-related Employment and Support Allowance (ESA).

Those benefits are all under the control of the DWP, with a particular emphasis on Universal Credit; Scottish benefits, including Council Tax Reduction and Disability Assistance, will not qualify claimants for the Scottish Child Payment.

The Economist is berated by right-wing libertarians on Twitter

An editorial in The Economist has expressed some concerns about the irresponsible pledges being made by the contenders for the leadership of the Conservative Party.

These proposals range from unwise to extraordinarily bad.  Mr Johnson’s tax cuts would be both a waste of scarce resources and grossly unfair.  He would reduce their cost by raising national-insurance contributions, a payroll tax.  As a result the biggest beneficiaries would be well-off pensioners, because payroll taxes fall only on those in work.  The policy is a shameless bribe to the elderly and prosperous Tory party members who choose the leader.

That critique has been rebuffed by neo-liberals on Twitter.  An argument from @_JamieWhyte runs as follows:

What do they mean? How are scarce resources wasted when the government collects less income tax? Does @TheEconomist  believe that private spending is more wasteful than govt spending? I cannot think of any other interpretation of this claim (help, anyone?)

That’s an intriguing argument, because it has implications its supporters may not have recognised.   If tax is a means of financing government, this would leave a deficit (which the Conservative right has consistently claimed it’s concerned about), and the money has to come from somewhere.  To govern is to choose, and this is a distributive decision.  If on the other hand tax reliefs are basically transfer payments – altering the balance of spending power between private citizens – then the same argument made here, that money held in private hands can’t be wasteful, also applies to social security payments, which are another way of doing the same. That can’t waste resources, either.

For most of the last sixty years, however, it’s largely been accepted that tax reliefs are simply a cost to government (the argument was made by Titmuss).  If they’re a cost, they must be justified; and a cost to benefit the rich, imposed at the expense of lower-paid workers, is hard to defend.

The libertarian right usually sees tax relief as allowing people to keep ‘their own’ money. The basic objection to that position is that incomes and tax rates are entirely conventional.  (Note that the defenders of the proposed tax cuts have been commenting that senior policemen and nurses – whose pay is determined entirely by public policy  – should not be subject to higher rates of tax. ) The reason why Nordic countries can sustain higher tax is that the structure of their incomes is different, and conversely the low taxes in Mexico are not compensated for by higher incomes.  No-one should imagine that, if the structure of tax rates was to be fundamentally reformed, their income will ultimately look the same as it does now.  We have to counter the illusion that tax is capturing people’s private incomes.  The distribution of income is not a private matter.

Social policy and interpersonal relations

Screwing my courage to the sticking place,  I have added a new page to An Introduction to Social Policy.  It’s about Social Policy and Interpersonal Relations, and it includes coverage of topics including the body, terminating pregnancy, sexuality, suicide and domestic violence, amongst other issues.

The website is used around the world, but few people have noticed the new page yet – there were 21 visitors last week out of 2,730 for the whole site.  The new page covers  potentially sensitive material, and  I’ve been acutely aware that what I write has to be useful for people in a variety of cultural settings.  I’d appreciate feedback.

What’s wrong with the idea of opening the NHS to US traders? Plenty.

There’s been a lot of discussion about the potential for a trade agreement with the USA and its possible impact on the NHS.  “I think everything with a trade deal is on the table,” Donald Trump has said.  “When you’re dealing in trade everything is on the tabl,e so NHS or anything else, a lot more than that, but everything will be on the table, absolutely.” The response of those who want there to be such an agreement has been to say that it won’t matter – a “storm in a teacup”, one IEA spokesperson commented. US firms are already providing services in UK health care.  Services can be provided by a range of providers; what matters for the consumer is that the NHS continues to offer services that are free at the point of delivery.

This view may be disingenuous, because there is a strong financial incentive not to see the problems.  It is certainly mistaken.  The usual complaints from the left are that profit-making firms are extractive, and that competition consumes resources.  Either might be true, but the problems run much deeper than that.  There is now abundant evidence of what happens to public services when ‘competition’ or part-privatisation is introduced.  I have just had a paper rejected which makes the arguments in some detail – admittedly it’s too tendentious for an academic journal – but I can sketch out a couple of points here.

There is no system, anywhere, that is wholly public, any more than there is a system that is wholly private.  The NHS has had an uncomfortable relationship with the private sector, but its successful functioning relies mainly on two pillars: that the private sector is small and select, and that the services are sufficiently integrated to ensure that really serious cases can be taken over by the national service.  Both of those are at risk from creeping commercialisation.

The fundamental problem in any mixed system is that commercial providers get to choose what they cover; public providers, committed to meeting the needs of a population, do not.  Commercial providers select those areas of operation which they are undertaking to provide – that is how markets work.  That means that in general they will select those activities which deliver the best return per unit.   It follows that some things will be left out; when they are, the public services will have to deal with them as provider of last resort.  (Take a simple illustration, delivering post and parcels.  If private firms can subcontract for the profitable bits, they choose the easy runs – between major cities, or within busy areas.  In the case of private health care, that has generally meant a preference for relatively low-risk elective surgery, while long term psychiatric or geriatric care don’t attract the insurers or the services.)

Taking those points together, that must also mean that public services have a higher cost per unit than the private services – the difference is built into the process.    Politically, there are constant complaints that public services don’t work as well as private ones.  Of course they don’t; they have to take on the bits that private providers leave behind.

That’s the unavoidable part of the problem.  Some other things follow in the wake of that structure.  They may be avoidable, but they are still difficult.

  • There is a continuing incentive for private providers to cut corners – skimping on service, paying less, holding to the letter of complex contracts.
  • The public sector has to develop processes for sub-contracting and compliance, which are expensive and uncertainly effective.
  • When private providers get it wrong, and services collapse, the public services have to pick up the pieces.

There’s obviously a lot more to be said about competitive structures, but that’s why I started out trying to write a paper on it rather than a blog entry.

One way to resolve the problems of means testing – just make the details up

I’m definitely slowing down; it’s the nearly the end of May and I’ve still got seven hundred pages to work through of the CPAG handbook.

I’ve been struck this time by something I really ought to have noticed before now, which is the system’s gradual, creeping dependence on imaginary money: ‘notional’ income,  earnings or capital, ‘deemed’ income, treating loans as income, attributing to people the benefits they haven’t claimed, ‘underlying’ entitlements, treating payments that are owed to a claimant as if they had actually been paid, and so on. For those of you who habitually don’t spend their time curled up with the Handbook, here are a few examples:

If your main work is self-employment but your earnings are low, your UC may be worked out on higher earnings than you have.  (p 119)

You may be treated as having notional income if … you work free of charge or for less than the going rate ( p 129)

If you fail to apply for income to which you are entitled without have to fulfil further conditions, you are treated as having it from the date you could have obtained it. (p 451)

Capital (unless it is disregarded) is assumed to provide a set rate of income – called ‘deemed income’ (p 477)

You may be treated as having notional capital if:

  • you deliberately deprive yourself of capital in order to claim or increase benefit
  • you fail to apply for capital which is available to you
  • you are a sole trader or a partner in a business which is a limited company (p 501)

You are treated as having ‘notional earnings’ if it is not possible to work out your actual earnings from employment or self-employment when your claim is decided (p 564)

Student loans for maintenance count as income if you could get a loan by taking ‘reasonable steps’, even if you choose not to apply for one.  (p 871)

The basic principle is that if people’s income is too complicated, too unstable or too uncertain to declare, the process of means-testing is going to plough on regardless.  They may not actually have any income, but we can still pretend that they have one. It’s a wonder that we’ve not thought more about make-believe food.  It’s the obvious answer to foodbanks.

How to abolish universal credit

An inquiry in London is asking how Universal Credit can be replaced.  I’ve previously supported calls to ‘pause’ or stop its roll-out.  Unfortunately, with more than two million people enrolled, we’re well past the point where it can be stopped or cancelled in its present form. The most important change passed when UC moved past its previous focus on unemployed people and started to enrol other people with a wide range of needs.   Most people who are unemployed cease to be unemployed within a few months, but longer-term claimants are much more likely to be chronically sick or disabled.  They need stable, secure protections. Universal Credit is not good at providing them, because of the  fluctuations in the level of support provided, but the support cannot just be removed while a new system is sorted out.   Transfers from existing benefits can be stopped, but new enrolments can’t be – there have to be benefits available for sickness, unemployment, low earnings.

What can be done, then, to deal with this catastrophe?  Forget the easy, unified solutions; that’s how the mess was made in the first place.  The only practical approach is to start to dismantle the system by moving to new, compartmentalised benefits dealing with the principal contingencies.  Start with invalidity, or long term sickness: it needs to be removed from the principle of work-testing, because the whole point of the provision is that it is supposed to deal with people who it’s not reasonable to expect to work.  Most of the regulations introduced for ESA or UC  have been screamingly inappropriate.  Think about child care; it may be best to take it out of the benefit system altogether.  The changes to Pension Credit are new – couples where one person is still of working age can transfer back to the pension system with no loss.  Housing Benefits are still largely in place – they won’t be for long, and local authorities have been losing expert staff, but the long-heralded abolition of Housing Benefit for pensioners hasn’t happened yet, and that system could keep going.

I’m not going to go through every aspect of the benefit in the same way, but the principle should be clear.  Whenever  you have a complicated problem, the way to deal with it is not with a single, complicated answer.  To deal with an unmanageable  problem, break it up into slightly less complicated ones; break those up in turn into smaller ones, and keep going until there’s a group of problems that it’s actually possible to deal with.

This is, of course, the opposite of what Universal Credit was supposed to do.  The approach is made a little easier by the fact that Universal Credit is not, and never could have been, a unified system: it already has compartments for different aspects of the service (unemployment, employment, housing and so forth).  The system can’t be abolished overnight.  It has to be taken apart piece by piece.

Sumption on the rule of law

While Jonathan Sumption’s Reith lectures offer some food for thought, some of his claims are  questionable.  This is from this morning’s lecture:

Democracies operate on the implicit basis that although the majority has authorised policies which a minority deplores, these differences are transcended by their common acceptance of the legitimacy of its decision-making processes.

Well … up to a point, m’lord.  It’s true that democracies depend heavily on legitimate processes in order to deliver legitimate outcomes. But it’s also true that those processes are not enough in themselves to ensure legitimacy.  Majorities, and apparently legitimate processes, authorised policies by Hitler and Mussolini.  Sumption cites James Madison in another context; this is what Madison has to say about majority rule:

It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure…. In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as that for religious rights. It consists in the one case in the multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on the number of interests and sects … In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger …

It’s fundamental to democracy that the rights of minorities are protected; if they are not, it is no longer a democracy.

Sumption’s view of the legal process, oddly for someone in his position, veers at times towards an ideal.

Law is rational. Law is coherent. Law is analytically consistent and rigorous.

If law was rational and coherent, it would be predictable.  We should be able to state with confidence what the law is as soon as we have seen an unequivocal statement in a statute, without waiting for confirmation from the courts.  Look at Sumption’s own comment on a Supreme Court decision:

The majority’s reason, however dressed up, was that they didn’t approve of the power that parliament had, on the face of it, conferred on ministers. Three of the judges thought that it was such a bad idea that parliament could not possibly have meant what it plainly said.

If the law was consistent and rigorous, it should be the case that the Supreme Court would deliver consistent, clear thematic judgements – but even when  they say they agree with each other, they can’t bring themselves to say the same things.

More fundamentally, if the law was consistent and rigorous, whether or not people’s interests are protected shouldn’t depend on whether or not they contest it.  Courts routinely rubber-stamp oppressive orders relating to debt simply because the debtors don’t make a submission. The big utility companies notoriously can afford to play the odds – losing a few cases they don’t seriously argue about because they routinely win so many without an argument.  The law, as Sumption says, has certain biases: “in favour of individual rights and traditional social expectations “.  But it also has a ferocious bias towards people who can afford to hire lawyers.

 

The public mood is swinging against Brexit

Views in the UK are polarised.  It is difficult to draw any clear message from the pattern of voting in the European elections, but the graph – prepared by the BBC, seems to mark a strong shift against Brexit.  You wouldn’t know it from the BBC’s Brexit coverage; I am listening now to a Radio Scotland item which is telling me that the Brexit Party romped home in the election.  Clearly, they didn’t.

The denial of votes to EU citizens on election day is another national disgrace; it will be the subject of legal action.  The assault on the rights of EU citizens goes rather beyond the 3.6 million people from the rest of Europe resident in the UK – or even them plus the 1.2 million UK residents in other European countries.  UK citizens are European citizens, too.  The formal census figures are out of date, as usual, but the population of the UK in 2017 was  roughly 66 million, and 90% are British nationals.  A further 5.6 million currently live abroad, of whom 1.2 million live in other EU countries.  We should perhaps discount 1.9 million people from Northern Ireland, because their rights are guaranteed if they so wish it by the Irish government, but that still leaves us with 57.7 million British nationals in the UK, and 5.6 million outside the UK, whose rights to European citizenship are being withdrawn.  In the 2016 referendum, 17.4 million people voted to leave the EU.  If we assume that all of them can be said to have consented to the loss of their rights, that still leaves 46.9 million other British citizens who are being denied their fundamental rights on the basis of that vote, and more than 50 million people when we consider European citizens from other countries living in Britain.