On the Labour manifesto

I had hoped that by now all the party manifestos would be available for review.  It seems that in our new, populist politics that policies don’t really matter that much, and everyone is waiting for a more opportune moment to reveal their plans.   The first manifesto off the stocks turns out to be the Labour Party’s, and that’s only because the manifesto has been leaked:  I read it via Guido Fawkes’ site.  It’s wordy, and there’s a lot of detail on some areas – just not the ones I usually get worked up about.

The main policies on social security are to

  • keep the triple lock on pensions
  • ‘review’ pension age
  • ‘review’ the two child policy
  • scrap sanctions
  • reverse a series of cuts, such as the bedroom tax and recent cuts to ESA
  • replace assessments with a “personalised, holistic assessment process”, and
  • restore Universal Credit work allowances.

That looks, then, like a commitment to retain Universal Credit, and indeed most of the current structure of benefits; the biggest commitment is to roll back benefits to how they were five years ago.

On housing, Labour will build more.

On health, the main commitment is to spend more and to cap waiting lists at 18 weeks. For mental health, the main  commitment is to spend more proportionally, and to do more about children’s mental health. For social care, care workers will be paid more.

The summary may seem sketchy; so, in my view, are the proposals.  There is rather more on transport, business and energy. Nor is there much about general principles, such as liberty, equality, solidarity or democracy.  The old-fashioned, fuddy-duddy stuff that excites me is just not what Labour is most concerned with.

 

The new Scottish Social Security Agency

The Scottish Government has published an Outline Business Case for its new Social Security Agency.  They are opting for

a central agency with enhanced phone and online support, which incorporates face-to-face pre-claims and support services locally in existing public sector locations and with assessments undertaken in a manner that is appropriate for policy choices that will be made as the final business case is progressed.

This is not a great surprise, because the Scottish Government has had a long-established preference for working through centralised agencies, and the case for doing this in a rights-based social security system is stronger than it is in fields which depend more heavily on professional judgment or local adaptation.  The Business Case says something about the kind of system they want Scottish social security to be, but the document is still vague about many of the specifics:  who the agency will be run by,  what the new benefits will be, or how the rules will be decided.

Criticism of a complacent Fabian

Apparently I’m a complacent Fabian.  I’ve just got round to reading Peter Beresford’s book, All our welfare (Policy Press, 2016).  Throughout his career he’s argued consistently for greater participation and empowerment for user services.  This is not his best work – I wanted to see more about what he’s proposing – but it continues to make the case.  He doesn’t like conventional studies in Social Policy (he lays into Peter Townsend at some length), and he certainly doesn’t like what I’ve written.  He cites this section from my text on Social Policy.  To keep the comments in context, I’ve bracketed off some bits he’s left out.

[The recipients of social services are not only disadvantaged in terms of their relationship with producers … The stigmatisation of recipients, their lack of resources and status, and their vulnerability pose important problems for the social services.  The development of formal mechanisms for protection, and substantive rights, offers a means by which the people who receive services are not solely dependent on decisions made by the producers of welfare; these rights represent one of the most important means through which recipients can be empowered.  But the social disadvantages remain;] people who are poor, disabled, mentally ill or unemployed cannot be expected to overcome the problems they face simply because they have more effective control over services.  [There are then limits to what it is possible to achieve in the narrow context of service delivery.]  It is important, too, not to overestimate the potential effects of this kind of procedure.  Dwyer lists some of the key objections to user-based approaches.  There are conflicts of interest between users of different types; users are often in competition for scarce resources with others; user groups can lose touch with their grass roots; and the process as a whole can contribute to the exclusion of marginal groups.

Last year I posted some material from a text that was complaining that I was part of a left-wing conspiracy.  Now it seems I’m part of another one, to suppress people who are marginalised.  Beresford writes (pp 355, 363):

It is difficult … not to detect some degree of complacency in social policy academic writings.  These have shown a reluctance to take on the bold new ideas and arguments developed by welfare user movements.  A strong sense of Fabian ‘business as usual’ lingers.  … [This] leads to one, more privileged, group offering its prescriptions for another, marginalised and devalued, group.  How else can we explain the routine exclusions that books like Spicker’s seems to rest on?

Spring, and a new CPAG handbook

April is the cruellest month, marked by the sound of the latest CPAG Welfare Rights Handbook thumping on the doormat.  I scan it every year to see what I’ve missed this time; I realise to my horror that this must be the fortieth year I’ve been doing this for.  In 1978, the National Welfare Benefits Handbook  had 103 pages, and the Guide to Contributory Benefits and Child Benefit  had 80.  The current edition of the handbook has 1,756.  I know less every year.

The main changes this year were telegraphed some time ago:

  • denying key benefits to the third child (the notorious rape clause is a by-product of that)
  • confining bereavement benefits to 18 months – ending one of the remaining strands of the Beveridge system
  • closing down class 2 National Insurance contributions – unpicking another part of the legacy
  • reducing support for people with long-term sickness to the level of the (short-term) JSA: this is a final reversal of a bipartisan policy to recognise long-term disadvantage, adopted with the introduction of Invalidity Benefit in 1971.

Most other changes are continuations of previous policies:

  • shifting new claims for several benefits to Universal Credit
  • closing down DLA for people of working age, so as to transfer people to PIP – the process should be complete by next year, and
  • the gradual introduction of entitlement under the new State Pension.

It’s only in the field of pensions that it’s possible to identify any real improvements in the system in the course of the last 10 years; but  that is not negligible, because it’s the largest single element in the benefits systems.

Review: B Greve (ed) Handbook of Social Policy Evaluation, Elgar 2017

This is a review of a book I’ve been sent by the publisher, Edward Elgar. I’ve explained the terms on which I review books here.

Bent Greve, the editor, explains that this book is intended to cover “methodologies, cases and how and when to make evaluation in social policy, and its possible impacts”.  Part 1 offers six chapters on the techniques, most of the chapters in part 2 discuss issues in evidence based policy making, mainly offer discussions of evidence on sixteen policy areas (though two of the seven chapters are really case studies rather than discussions of that sort), and part 3 has ten further chapters of case studies.  That really means that half this book is about evaluation and evidence, and half is discussion of specific policies.  The more interesting case studies, to my mind,  were on medicines, long term care and interventions for children, but none is exceptional.  A couple of the other case studies are discussions of policy, not centrally about evidence or evaluation at all.  This does not add up to either a book on evaluation, or a handbook for people who want to do one.

The real place to start, unfortunately, is the price.  This book, 520 pages plus index, costs £195 – that’s not a misprint.  (NB: Since I posted this review, the publishers have told me there is a cheaper e-version at £36 on Google Play.)   The price might be defended for a library purchase if this was an irreplaceable, essential read, but it’s hard for any collection of papers to meet that standard.  Like most collections, it has a mix of good and not so good, and there’s a lot of competition out there.  On evaluation, Parsons’s short book on Demystifying Evaluation (Policy Press, 2017) is a relatively  accessible and practical guide.  I still like Michael Scrivens’ Evaluation Thesaurus, even if it was published in 1991; his evaluation checklist is available free on line.  On evidence and policy, there have been several recent books; I’d recommend Justin Parkhurst’s The politics of evidence (Routledge, 2016) an insightful and well-written book that explains a lot of what’s wrong with the main approach in this one.  Parkhurst’s book is available in a free Open Access version.

There’s other stuff out there for free, too.  The World Bank offers a virtual library of methods and case studies in evaluation, along with guides such as P Gertler et al,  Impact evaluation in practice (World Bank, 2011).  There are problems with the  World Bank’s approach; it’s technocratic and liable to be uncritical.  The objections are

  • theoretical – evaluations, especially RCTs,  often look at the wrong things in the wrong way;
  • political: aims, methods and outcomes cannot be understood in a political vacuum;
  • statistical: the variables are interdependent, the methods heavily sensitive to the statistical assumptions  and results are unlikely to be replicable; and
  • evidential: the available data don’t support the main methods.  Garbage in, Garbage out.

Some of the writers for the Handbook refer to some of these points, but neither the criticisms nor the practicalities are dealt with thoroughly.   A reader has to dig for the objections, because they are referred to in the context of the paper where they occur, not systematically – you have to get through a hundred pages, well into the chapter on systematic reviews, before you even catch the sense that the “evidence hierarchy” introduced on page 6 is contentious.  There may be room for a state-of- the-art review of evaluation and policy, but this isn’t it.

The Irish Department of Social Protection is clamping down on people with false beards

There are times when the surreal breaks through the curtain to engulf our dull grey world, and a note from Ireland gives me the sense that another such moment is upon us.  A new fraud initiative based on facial identification promises to cut off the presumably lucrative trade in disguises and false beards.  According to the Irish Independent, the minister for Social Protection has reassured an apprehensive public that “Welfare cheats using make-up and fake beards to get benefits won’t beat the ID software.”  That must be a relief.  I do not know how many cases there have been of theatrical imposture undermining the integrity of Irish benefits, but given the expense of introducing such a system I am sure the threat must have been substantial.

New research: listening to social security officers

For the last three months, I’ve been working with Helen Flanagan of PCS to listen to the voices of social security officers about the social security system.  PCS is the civil service union representing people working for the DWP, HMRC and others.  Helen’s explanation of the work can be seen here, but it will be mid-May before we’re able to publish the findings in detail.  Yesterday’s meeting made liberal use of the things said by DWP officers, in three contexts: a pamphlet issued by PCS on the Future of Social Security in Scotland, a film by Jennifer Jones, and initial findings from our report – we still have statements from fifty or more people to process.

This is from Helen’s summary.

  • Over 200 staff have participated so far, in their own time, from a range of DWP workplaces in Scotland.
  • Discussions were not limited to the devolved powers, we wanted input on policy, structure, working conditions, the experience of service uses, and what goes wrong with service delivery.
  • What we have with DWP is a system in chaos: the constant change and reorganisation of work, with inadequate staffing levels, poor training and failing off-the-shelf IT systems.
  • What we have also found is a real desire from staff in DWP to be able to serve people better, and for a system that treats those applying for help with humanity.

And, although I can’t really do justice to the range of issues, or the sincerity of people’s voices, in a short soundbite, let me pick out a couple of things that people have told us:

Really senior leaders are saying that we’ve never gone through the scale of these changes, but then on the other hand, things are just pushed through without planning. They expect staff to be ‘calm amongst the madness’, but then staff are then  hit about the head by management if they don’t adapt to the changes properly.

Segmentation plays a big part in bad service. Cases bounce about. It’s really difficult to embed with it or own it yourself. You can’t take ownership of anything.

The current robotic system fails to take much notice of the human factor and the fact we are dealing with real people

Morale is appalling. The deskilling that goes on in this place is appalling. I … was no more skilled than anyone else when I came in. All the changes that have come in over that time, I’ve had skills and training, but they’ve picked away at all that specialisation and skill, so you’re demoralised and run down. You have to put you in menial tasks and deal with small stuff rather than deal with proper work.

P.S: This was my 800th posting on the blog.

 

Benefit administration: some lessons from the United States

The UK may have some claim to distinction in its efforts to transform the benefits system, but we are not alone.  In the United States, revisions to health care have been taken as a stimulus to States to introduce new computer systems that will solve all the problems, typically covering Medicaid (health care for people on low incomes), food stamps and other benefits such as help with maternity.  Kentucky was early off the blocks: they hired Deloitte Consulting to introduce a new system.  50,000 people suffered ‘massive disruption.’  The Kentucky Courier-Journal reported:

“State workers, bewildered by the complicated new Benefind system, find themselves obstructed from helping many clients by errors, glitches and programming flaws.”

When Deloitte moved on to their next big contract with Rhode Island, covering 30,000 people a month, they were determined not to repeat the same mistakes.  A spokeswoman explained to the Providence Journal in Rhode Island:

“The design, development, testing and implementation of this new system is unique to Rhode Island and the people we serve. Kentucky used a different approach on all of these things.”

Instead, they found new ones to make. The Governor of Rhode Island complained that

“We paid them a lot of money, we didn’t get what we paid for. And they represented to us that it was in much better shape than in fact it was: defective functionality, incomplete interfaces, engines that still aren’t working.”

The formal  Assessment of the Unified Health Infrastructure Project  (it’s quite short, and worth reading) reports that

  • the IT system was not functioning properly
  • despite reassurances from the contractor, the system was not ready to go live when it did
  • too much was taken on trust because of the contractor’s experience in industry
  • staff had not been properly trained
  • “Basic user functionality and important interfaces … have significant defects or have been deferred, requiring extensive manual workaround processes”
  • benefits were not processed when they should be, and not withdrawn when entitlement had ceased; there were “errors in eligibility determination, benefits issuance, and
    provider payments”.

To those engaged in Universal Credit, it all looks eerily familiar.

Nothing daunted, Deloitte is now engaged in an even bigger project, providing a new system for income testing and assessment for the state of Georgia, expected to cover three million people.  A spokeswoman for Georgia’s Department of Human Services has reassured Georgia Health News that “We had the benefit of watching other states.”   As do we.

Arguments for welfare

Arguments for welfareI’ve received today the copies of my new book, Arguments for Welfare.  It’s a short book at 117 pages, published by Rowman and Littlefield at the hefty price of £19.95.  From the cover:

This book makes the case for the welfare state. Nearly every government in the developed world offers some form of social protection, and measures to improve the social and economic well-being of its citizens. However, the provision of welfare is under attack. The critics argue that welfare states are illegitimate, that things are best left to the market, and that welfare has bad effects on the people who receive it. If we need to be reminded why we ought to have welfare, it is because so many people have come think that we should not. Arguments for Welfare is a short, accessible guide to the arguments. Looking at the common ideas and reoccurring traits of welfare policy across the world it discusses: the meaning of the ‘Welfare State’, the moral basis of social policy, the limits of markets, public service provision and the role of government.   With examples from around the world, the book explains why social welfare services should be provided and explores how the principles are applied. Most importantly, it argues for the welfare state’s continued value to society.

 

John Slater explains the thinking behind the project management of Universal Credit

John Slater has been responsible for a series of Freedom of Information requests about the Universal Credit fiasco.  Yesterday he sent me a copy of the project management plan  introduced by Howard Shiplee, who was responsible for the development of Universal Credit from May 2013 until his departure, following illness, in September 2014.  Shiplee had previously been responsible for building construction for the 2012 Olympic Games.

I was puzzled by the plan, and wrote back to John:

I’m baffled – I can see no relationship between the steps to be taken and the design of a social security system. It looks more like a plan for building a McDonalds outlet, where all the groundwork’s laid and you know exactly what you want to do, so it’s all about delegating tasks. … I think you’re a project manager, John – – can you explain it to me?

I found John’s response so marvellously clear and helpful that I asked him if I could share it on the blog.  Here it is.

“Hi Paul,

You are right my background is programme and project management (my first degree was IT so I understand that aspect as well). You aren’t far off with your McDonalds analogy.

The plan is a classic case of an organisation focusing on the IT side of a major change programme. UC is one of the biggest change programme ever undertaken and nothing I’ve ever seen produced by the DWP reflects this.

The 100 day plan is a classic example of people that have been on a training course (e.g. Prince2 or Management Successful Programmes) but have never done the job for real. If you look down the left hand side of the ‘plan’ you’ll see the following headings:

  1. Key dates & decisions
  2. BT – Business (I suspect BT means business transformation)
  3. BT – Service Design & Build (I suspect BT means business transformation)
  4. BT Interfaces (I suspect BT means business transformation)
  5. Pathfinder Day 2
  6. Programme Approach
  7. HR
  8. Finance
  9. Assurance
  10. Security
  11. Comms (Communications)
  12. Stakeholder
  13. Supplier

With the exception of point 1 these are typically referred to a work streams. The idea is that each of the workstreams goes along their merry way cooperating with each other to deliver the programme. The reality of this approach with any complex programme is that it always goes horribly wrong.

If you look at points 2 to 5 then it is utterly focused on the IT. The plan looks like something to produce a software product of some sort. There is no mention of culture change, process engineering (this should be done before any software is produced) and the biggest issue of all people! This covers the claimants, DWP employees, Council Employees, Welfare Advisors and so on. They are just expected to magically learn and make it work. The trouble is human beings don’t work that way.

Part of the issue is that the DWP employees working on UC at the time hadn’t ever done anything like this before so didn’t have a clue. The put people in roles (e.g. programme manager, programme office manager etc) but they hadn’t done it before and had just been sent on a training course.

I’ve been doing this stuff for 30 years and I would have struggled to get UC up and running (and I’m very good at this aspect of complex programmes). Bringing in someone like Howard Shiplee was always going to fail. I’ve run programmes involving a lot of construction and it’s a different world and a totally different mindset. I suspect if you looked at the approach used for construction during the London Olympic build it wouldn’t look dissimilar to this plan. With construction the focus is generally on design and then build (known as D&B). The key factor is the supply chain and can the main contractor get the materials and people on site on time and in the right order. If you look at the plan again I don’t think it’s unreasonable to see the left hand side of the dark vertical as ‘design’ and the right hand side as ‘build’. This is what Howard Shiplee understood and it was so deeply ingrained I doubt he could have done anything else.

In respect of the pathfinder system released at Wigan it was a cobbled together lobotomised version of the IT that would ultimately be required for the complete UC. At this stage of the programme IDS knew the IT was fundamentally flawed, hence the talk of large sums being written off at the time. He also knew that they had to start over again but couldn’t admit that as it would be politically disastrous. Therefore, they rolled out the lobotomised version that only covered a small subset of people claiming JSA and claimed success. While this version was being rolled out painfully slowly the DWP was working desperately to produce a brain new IT system that ultimately will be the UC IT System.

Personally I think the new IT system will also fail. The methodology (Agile) as it’s been used by the DWP means that too much has been done in isolation. The system is going to be extremely complex and as bugs appear I’m not convinced the DWP will be able to find out the cause and then develop a solution that doesn’t result and another problem.

Kind Regards

John”