Poverty, democratic governance and poverty reduction strategies

I have given a presentation today at an International Symposium in Istanbul, Turkey, organised by Fatih Sultan Mehmet Vakif University and Sosyal Politikalar Dernegi.  The argument was this:

The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers have become a significant experiment in world governance.  Poverty is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon, and responses to poverty need to be adapt to a wide range of circumstances.  In the belief that deliberative democracy is the route to prosperity, international organisations have directed governments around the world to undertake a process of strategic planning, based on participative development and negotiation of policy with stakeholders. However, the emphasis in the PRSPs seems to have fallen more on the methods they use than the substance of the strategies.  Democracy is not valued only for its process; it matters what it achieves.   If PRSPs are to help the poor, they need to extend their focus, moving beyond procedural issues towards substantive policies that stand to benefit the poor.

Here is a copy of the slides and a copy of the paper.

Symposium in Istanbul

The scope of the welfare state

Policy Press asked me recently to lead off a discussion on the Welfare State with a short 300 words. My contribution is here.

The issue I’ve raised is about the scope of government, and that will be part of my next book, Reclaiming Individualism. The typescript will go to the publisher in August for publication next April.

The timetable for Universal Credit

Taken together, two recent announcements point to an important concession in the plans for introducing Universal Credit. Initially the government planned to take all new claims and significant changes from October 2013. The current plan is first to run a pilot in Manchester and Cheshire, taking about 1500 claims a month for six months. The next six months will see a roll-out to one district in each region. All new claims will finally be taken by mid-2014, rather than October 2013 as planned. Both the testing and the delay are welcome; they reduce the potential for the kind of administrative crash that seemed to be looming. However, as the processes that are needed do not exist yet, it is difficult to say more about what this is all going to mean for claimants.

The impact of DLA changes

Last week, I was asked what I thought the impact would be of DLA changes, but I didn’t feel I could give a sensible answer. The problem I have is straightforward. If the Personal Independence Payment removes the lower rate of the care component, it is not possible to assume that the same number of people will get the new care component as those who currently get the higher and middle rates of DLA. Part of the problem, too, is that it’s never been very clear on what basis people get the lower rate rather than the middle rate – it often hangs on a distinction between care for “a significant portion of the day” and “frequent care throughout the day”. Welfare rights advisers just encourage claimants to put in an application regardless, and that’s what they will need to do with the new rules when they’re finalised.

Today, I’ve just seen the government’s response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and it looks as if the government can’t give a sensible answer either. They comment that “The ability to undertake cumulative analysis is limited because of the complexity of the modelling required and the amount of detailed information on individuals and families that is required to estimate the interactions of a large number of different policy changes.”

Good news from Africa

This table is drawn from a recent study looking at the fall of mortality in Kenya. It points to a general trend: across Africa, more children are surviving.

Under 5 mortality (per 1000 live births)
Previous studies (1998-2007)

Most recent study (2005-2009)
Benin

160 (2001)

125 (2006)
Ethiopia

166 (2000)

124 (2005)
Ghana

111 (2003)

80 (2008)
Kenya

115 (2003)

74 (2009)
Liberia

110 (2007)

114 (2009)
Madagascar

94 (2004)

72 (2009)
Mali

229 (2001)

191 (2006)
Namibia

62 (2000)

69 (2007)
Niger

274 (1998)

198 (2006)
Nigeria

201 (2003)

157 (2008)
Rwanda

152 (2005)

103 (2008)
Senegal

121 (2005)

85 (2009)
Tanzania

147 (1999)

112 (2005)
Uganda

152 (2001)

128 (2006)
Zambia

168 (2002)

119 (2007)
Zimbabwe

102 (1999)

83 (2006)

Stephen Radelet, in Emerging Africa?, claims that the factors behind this improvement are

  • “more democratic and accountable governments
  • more sensible economic policies,
  • the end of the debt crisis and major changes in relationships with the international community
  • new technologies that are creating new opportunities for business and political accountability, and
  • a new generation of policymakers, activists, and business leaders.”

There are problems – such as the recent (hopefully short term) increase in mortality in Liberia. But the trend is clear, and it is very good news indeed – especially for those who are concerned about population increase, because there is a clear and strong association between infant survival and the number of children a woman must have.

Report of the Welfare Reform Committee

The Scottish Parliament’s Welfare Reform Committee has issued its stage 1 report. They express “grave concern” about the current progress of welfare reform, making these points:

• changes to the benefits system will remove lifeline benefits from large numbers of vulnerable people;
• the means of applying for new benefits is complex …
• 330.000 people are caught within an appeals system that overturns two thirds of these assessment results …
• there will be major impacts on the independence of disabled people, and on child poverty and homelessness levels;
• the likelihood of individuals and families getting into serious debt … is increased;
• the Department of Work and Pensions … has done limited work to assess the impacts on different groups …

There is also a short section on the issue I have been raising:

Social Fund
103. In its early consideration of the Bill the Committee harboured some concerns about the absence from it of powers in relation to the discretionary elements of the Social Fund, which have been devolved.
104. The Committee also received written evidence from Professor Paul Spicker, Grampian Chair of Public Policy at the Robert Gordon University. In his evidence Professor Spicker contends that there are legal competence issues for the Scottish Government in undertaking some aspects of welfare reform, including the discretionary elements of the social fund that have been devolved:
Professor Paul Spicker – There needs in particular to be a residual power to promote welfare and to give financial assistance to any person – the same power currently possessed by English local authorities. As things stand, the promotion of welfare, and payments of financial assistance to individuals by way of benefits, are ultra vires.
105. In her evidence to the Committee on 1 May, the Cabinet Secretary explained that the Scottish Government will put in place interim arrangements using the general power of wellbeing that local authorities possess, along with a section 30 order to facilitate that 107 . In the longer term the proposal is to introduce a social fund bill in 2013-4, coming into force in 2015. The Committee welcomes the clarification from the Cabinet Secretary on interim arrangements for council tax discounts and the social fund and looks forward to assessing these arrangements and contributing to their development in due course.”

Life expectancy and pensions

A report by PWC on pensions draws attention to some fairly startling projections about life expectancy; they claim that pensioners born in 2050 will have an average life expectancy of 104. The source of the prediction are tables produced by the Office of National Statistics – this link goes to their main projection. For people born in 2050, the projection is that 48.4% of males, and 55% of females, will live to 100. The ONS also note that “As only one person worldwide has ever been verified as living beyond 120, estimates of numbers surviving to very old ages are highly uncertain.”

There are no strong reasons here for immediate panic. Even if the pension age stays at 66, people born today will not get their pension until 2078; and the troublingly long-lived babies of 2050 will get their pension in 2116. That is far enough away for our great grandchildren to be able to do the sums, probably a little more effectively than we can.

Value for money in child care

The recent events in Rochdale, where under-age girls were forced into prostitution, have mainly focused on other issues. Prostitution has been a long-standing problem for young people in care – vulnerable teenagers who have been abused and sexualised at a young age, are often open to the opportunity, and no institution has ever found a satisfactory resolution. One of the issues which came out of the recent case was that one young girl who was placed in a single unit, with six full time workers, nevertheless managed to spend one or two nights a week out – 19 times in three months, which sounds worse.

The cost of this private unit has been reported variously at £225,000 to £250,000 a year. Most authorities have some children farmed out in this sort of arrangement. That poses a question which has mainly been considered at much lower levels of need – whether such intensive childcare is justifiable. We know that the outcomes of formal care are generally poor, and that many arrangements end up making things worse. But there is a standard, default comparison: how a child would fare in substitute family care instead. What are the objections to paying a full-time foster parent a living income – say, £40,000 a year – instead of paying £225,000 for six-full time workers?

There are four main objections, and none of them seems to me to stack up. The first is professional training. I think we have to ask what a very damaged child needs to have provided on a 24 hour, 365 basis – thoughtful, systematic intervention or a secure, protective life style. There is no reason why these cannot both be done – but also no reason why they have to be done at the same time. The second is the variable quality of foster care, including – in the worst cases – abuse. That is true, but the same is true of residential units. Many local authorities take the view that they cannot pass an ungovernable child to any but the best foster parent. While I understand their reticence, the illusion is that they have a better option in residential care.

The third is that it is not possible to pay someone a large amount of money in a fostering allowance without treating them as an employee. That’s not right – this is family support, and family support doesn’t have respite or hourly rates of pay – but clarification of the law would help. The fourth is that while one can pass legal responsibility to a private provider, a local authority cannot pass it to a foster parent. That is true, but it shouldn’t matter. Local authorities are not minimising harm to a child by keeping the child in residential care instead. In relation to the third and fourth points, both hang on current constructions of legal responsibility. If the law is working against the child’s best interests, we should change it.

There are no general rules, but in every case where a child is in residential care, the question needs at least to be asked: why is this child not in substitute family care instead? If the only objections are the four I have mentioned, they should be overruled. Increasing the use of substitute care in the most difficult circumstances will inevitably lead to some bad decisions, and some disasters, but let’s be blunt: it’s disastrous now.

Scotland's powers and the Social Fund

This is from a discussion from the Scottish Parliament’s Welfare Reform Committee, 1st May 2012:

Jackie Baillie: Evidence from Professor Paul Spicker suggested that the Scottish Government does not have the power and competence to deliver benefits and the replacement social fund, and you appear to have opted to use local government powers, through a section 30 order. Is that why you said that you are considering introducing a social fund bill in 2013-14?
Nicola Sturgeon: We would need the section 30 order to legislate, as well. We have chosen the approach that I described partly for reasons of speed, so that we can get the interim arrangements in place, and because we are confident that we can do it in such a way. Our preferred approach of legislating later is just that—a preferred approach—and is not being taken because we consider that we require primary legislation. However, because of the interaction with social security we need a section 30 order, combined with the general power to advance wellbeing that local authorities have, to put the arrangements in place.
Jackie Baillie: Was he correct to say that there are issues of competence, which you have managed to overcome?
Nicola Sturgeon: To whom are you referring?
Jackie Baillie: Professor Paul Spicker.
Nicola Sturgeon: Before I could say whether he was correct I would need to look at the evidence. I would be happy to do so and to tell the committee what we think of it, if that would be helpful.
Jackie Baillie: It would be helpful to our consideration to understand what powers the Scottish Government has and for what purpose you would seek a section 30 order.”

So – am I right? The straight answer is, I don’t know. The issues are complex; the powers conveyed by the devolution settlement relating to local government can be read in different ways; in the event of a dispute, it is often difficult to know what an authoritative interpretation would look like. My main concern in raising the matter publicly now is to ensure that any resolution will not involve delay, confusion or denial of service to people in need. The resolution seems to hang on what the proposed section 30(2) order actually says. I am reasonably confident that the problems can be ironed out, but any practical solution is going to need to clear the ground so that Scottish and local government can operate effectively.

A further note, June 2012. A note from Nicola Sturgeon says this:

“The Scottish Government’s position on Professor Spicker’s submission is that his analysis of the power to promote well-being, specifically as enabled by section 20(2)(b) of the Local Government (Scotland) Act 2003 is generally consistent with our own analysis … we do intend to work with the UK Government to bring forward an order under section 30 of the Scotland Act, to ensure that the desired policy can be delivered using to power to promote well-being.”

Personalisation falls short

This is the abstract of an article I’ve written, newly published in the British Journal of Social Work.

Personalisation offers individualised treatment in circumstances where markets do not operate. Personalisation is described variously as a process involving an individualised assessment and response, the expression of individual preferences and choices, or a process in which users and professionals negotiate a common understanding of the needs of the individual. The core arguments for individualised approaches are effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness to need. However, personalisation sometimes falls short of the claims made for it. It is not always effective, because matching people to resources is time-consuming, difficult and dependent on so many conditions that mismatches are inevitable. It may be inefficient, because it is difficult to deliver selective services without either misplaced provision or inappropriate denial of service. There is only limited support to be found for the belief that services have become more responsive to individual circumstances as a consequence of personalisation, or that they are better matched to need. The case for personalisation has to be argued and proved in the context in which it is applied.